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Nov.-Dec., 1955
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST, Professor of Law, University of Denver
The past year was marked by a number of opinions by the
Supreme Court of Colorado on constitutional matters. The decisions
dealt with important matters, for the most part. But of equal im-
portance with the substance of what was decided is the manner
of deciding cases. In its approach to the decision of cases, the
Court appeared during the year to vacillate between caution and
boldness in ruling on constitutional matters.
As for the substance, the Court held the Denver ordinance
authorizing conditional suspensions of sentences for ordinance
violations to be invalid in a difficult to follow opinion. A Littleton
license tax upon curb cuts was found to violate constitutional man-
dates requiring uniformity in taxation. The Colorado statute pro-
viding for the effect to be given foreign judgments in divorce and
support matters was struck down, without the citation of as much
as a single authority from this or any other jurisdiction, and on a
constitutional ground never raised or argued in either the trial
court or in the Supreme Court. By way of contrast, the Court
was cautious in refusing to give the Senate an advisory opinion
on the constitutionality of the new severance tax, lest private
rights be prejudiced in a non-adversary proceeding. Similarly, the
Court cautiously employed a case by case approach in considering
the validity of the statute governing the procedure of criminal
trials in which insanity is pleaded by way of defense. The Court
avoided this question altogether in one case, reversing a conviction
on other grounds. And in another case, in which the convic-
tion was reversed because of errors in the giving of instruc-
tions and admission of evidence, the Court ruled that the statu-
tory procedure did not deprive the defendant of any of his
constitutional rights since he had been accorded a fair trial and
it therefore didn't matter what might be done to him under the
statute, if it were followed.
If some of the remarks in an analyses of the opinions which
follow seem sharply critical, it would be well to bear in mind what
seem to the author to be factors which contribute substantially
to decisions that are sometimes somewhat less than clear cut,
sometimes wrong and totally unsupported by authority. A study
of the briefs and argument of counsel in an oustanding instance
or two indicates that counsel sometimes make constitutional argu-
ments without citing either the constitutional language upon which
counsel rely or any of the authorities which might support the ar-
gument. A busy court, unassisted by law clerks, can hardly be
expected to research every point raised by counsel and to find the
authorities to complete counsel's argument. It can be said that the
' The year intervening between the October, 1954, convention of the Colorado
Bar Association and that of October, 1955.
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better opinions are on those cases in which counsel has been most
helpful to the Court. The Court, of course, must accept the re-
sponsibility for deciding cases on points never raised or argued
by counsel.
POWER OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT TO IMPOSE CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES
In Holland v. McAuliffe -' the ordinance of the City and County
of Denver was invalidated which authorized its Municipal Court
to impose conditional sentences and suspend fines or imprison-
ment during observance by a defendant of the condition. The
defendant in the Municipal Court of Denver was convicted on
Sept. 11, 1953, of violations of the motor vehicle traffic ordinances.
He was sentenced for a total of 90 days in the county jail and
fines totalling $200. The Court, purporting to act under a 1950
ordinance, suspended the jail sentence and $100 of the fines on
condition that defendant "refrain from driving any motor vehicle
for one year from date." More than 4 months thereafter. and
purporting to act under an amendment of the 1950 ordinance ef-
fective Nov. 21, 1953, the Municipal Court caused defendant to be
arrested for non-compliance with the condition. Defendant had
driven a motor vehicle in Adams County on January 7, 1954. The
ordinance of 1950 had provided that sentences could be suspended
conditionally by the Municipal Court but made no provisions for
reinstatement of the penalties for violation of the conditions. Pur-
suant to the amendment, the Municipal Court vacated the sus-
pension, reinstated the original penalties, and denied defendant's
application to appeal because the appeal was not perfected within
the 10 days after final judgment as required by the statute.
Defendant filed a complaint in the Superior Court, seeking an
order prohibiting the Municipal Court from any further pro-
ceedings. Attack was made upon the order of the Municipal Court
on the grounds, among others, that (1) the ordinance was repug-
nant to the Colorado Constitution and the city charter limiting
the jurisdiction of the Justice and Municipal Courts to penalties
of $300 fine or 90 days in the county jail; (2) the ordinance pro-
viding for reinstatement of penalties was retroactively applied-
in what respect retroactivity is repugnant to the Constitution was
not specified by counsel-; and (3) even if valid, the ordinance
could not be applied as against this defendant because to do so
would be to give extra-territorial effect to the orders of the Munici-
pal Court since the violation of the conditional suspension took
place in Adams County-and the Court was not advised by counsel
of any constitutional reason why the Municipal Court could not
look beyond the city limits.
Concerning the question whether the Municipal Court had
exceeded its jurisdiction, the Court refers to Article VI, Section
'Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 13, p. 463; 286 P. 2d 1107.
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28, of the State Constitution and to Article VIII, Section 156 and
Article XIV, Section 219 of the city charter as authority for invali-
. dating the ordinance. The pertinent part of the State Constitu-
tion requires that all laws relating to courts shall be general and
of uniform operation. The charter provisions alluded to place
original jurisdiction in the justice courts over all cases of violation
of the charter or ordinances and provide that the council shall have
power to enforce ordinances by ordaining fines not exceeding $300
or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days. The Court concluded,
". .. contrary to the terms of the ordinance this jurisdiction can-
not extend beyond the limit of the ninety-day jurisdiction of the
court. The ordinance attempting to provide such probationary
jurisdiction or control of the defendant for a period of two years,
is clearly beyond the limit of any jail sentence that could be im-
posed."
Very little attention and no authority was given to the prop-
osition that the ordinance was retroactively applied and therefore
invalid as to the defendant. The Court ventured the opinion that
"While summary procedure in police court cases is countenanced
from the standpoint of expedience, such recognition does not
tolerate retroactive procedure such as above indicated." Why? The
Court does not tell us, and counsel nowhere advised the Court that
any provision in the State Constitution or charter prohibits the
enactment of laws having retrospective operation.
Only bare mention was made by the Court concerning the con-
tention that the Municipal Court was attempting to assume extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Said the Supreme Court: "The condition
upon which the suspension was entered, namely, 'refrain from
driving any motor vehicle for one year from date,' if given the
effect the police court seemed to invoke, the court's jurisdiction
would apparently become worldwide regardless of the territorial
limits, because the alleged violation of the suspension condition
here was not within the territorial limits of the City and County
of Denver." If the Supreme Court meant so to rule, it gives us
no specific reason, constitutional or otherwise. And if the Court
meant so to rule, does the rule not also invalidate the statutes 3
permitting peace officers of Colorado to pursue and take fugitives
from Colorado from other states without interference and waiving
legal requirements for extradition, and permitting Colorado parole
and probation officers to go into another state to which parolees
and probationers have been released and to arrest and return
such parolees and probationers to Colorado for violation of the
terms of their parole or probation in such other state? The
Supreme Court of the United States, while not ruling on the speci-
fic question before us, has held that nothing in the Constitution
174-3-3 and 4 and 74-3-9, '53 C.R.S. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
-4(d) (2) and (3), and 4(f)-providing for service of Summons on residents of
Colo. found outside the State, may also be in peril if the Court meant what it
seems to have said.
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of the United States prevents Wisconsin from conditioning the
collection of an income tax, on income earned in Wisconsin, upon
the payment of dividends out of that income in the State of New
York.4 And in Milliken v. Meyer,5 a case with which our Court
should be familiar, the Supreme Court of the United States held
valid a judgment of a Wyoming court whose jurisdiction over the
defendant was conditioned upon the service of summons in Denver.
As a practical matter, the Court could have avoided any ref-
erence to the questions of retroactivity and extra-territoriality
since the ordinance under which the Municipal Court purported to
act had been declared invalid as being in excess of the powers of
the city council and jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. As a con-
stitutional law case, the opinion must be considered as having
value and as speaking with authority only to the effect that the
imposition of conditional sentences for a period in excess of the
90 days which justice courts are empowered to impose in Deliver
is an attempt to exercise a power not given to the City and conse-
quently invalid.
TAXATION OF PROPERTY RIGHT DISGUISED AS FEE FOR REGULATION
In a case involving the ordinances of the City of Littleton.6
the defendant was charged with and convicted of violation of an
ordinance providing "that for the purpose of regulating streets,
• . . the use and manner of motor vehicles entering and leaving
private property from and to the public streets and avenues; the
use of vehicular parking space or spaces along the curb lines of
streets and avenues;" the owner of any property having a curb
cut, used for business purposes in a commercial zone, shall obtain
a permit from the Building Inspector and pay an annual fee there-
for. The defendant was assessed a fee for use of a concrete apron
between the street and the sidewalk abutting on defendant's place
of business. The apron, falling to the level of the street and not
separated therefrom by a curb, ran all along the side of defendant's
property for half a block. It had been installed years before en-
actment of the ordinance in question. While the apron abutted
on defendant's property for a distance of 146 feet, the City assessed
defendant only for that 44 feet which seemed, on examination of
vehicle tracks, to be used by defendant in entering and leaving his
property. Revenue from the curb cut fees was placed in the City's
general fund.
Issues considered by the Court included the contention that
if the fee imposed is not justified as a regulatory police measure
it is invalid both as a purported property tax and as a license fee.
The Court found the revenue raising character of the fee to be un-
IWisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267
(1940).
5 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940).
' Heckendorf v. Littleton, Colorado Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number
12; 286 P. 2d 615.
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mistakable since the City spent no money for regulation of the use
of the curb cut and engaged in no inspection other than to measure
the cut and assess the fee. Nor could the Court find any special
privilege enjoyed by the defendant aside from the privilege of
entering and leaving his property, which privilege looked like a
property right, and the taxation of which rendered the tax in vio-
lation of the uniformity required by Article X of the State Con-
stitution in the levying of taxes.
The result seems to be consistent with Walker v. Bedford 7
in which it was held that a special additional registration fee on
motor vehicles was an exaction for no special privilege in particu-
lar or for any regulatory purpose but rather for the sole purpose
of raising revenue. The tax was laid according to the value of the
motor vehicle. The statute involved was entitled "An Act to Pro-
vide Additional Emergency Relief Funds . . ." and its character
as a revenue raising measure without any purported regulation
was clear. Property, then, was the only ascertainable base upon
which the exaction could fall; and the additional tax on only one
kind of property destroyed the uniformity of the property tax.
The decision in the instant case should not discourage a city
from taxing curb cuts if it desires to do so. There is ample author-
ity in the Colorado cases to sustain a realistic license tax, as dis-
tinguished from a tax which seems to fall upon nothing if not upon
property." One who employs a curb cut to enter his property from
the front or along the side, rather than at the rear, actually is
enjoying a special right or privilege in the use of the street, in-
consistent with the right of the general public to use that part of
the street for proper purposes such as parking. In addition, one
who enjoys a curb cut may be depriving the city of revenues de-
rived from parking meters which might otherwise have been in-
stalled, and for that special privilege the user of the curb cut may
be required to pay tribute. The problem seems to be one primarily
of draftsmanship of ordinances, in which the tax must be made
to appear as a license fee for regulatory purposes or as an excise
tax upon a special privilege.
THE COURT REFUSES AN ADVISORY OPINION
The Senate, pursuant to Article VI, Section 3, of the State
Constitution, requested an advisory opinion on seven questions
propounded to the Court. The subject matter of the inquiry was
the proposed severance tax act passed by the House and under con-
sideration in the Senate. The questions propounded called for de-
cisions on close and intricate issues involving the validity of the
tax and the distribution of the proceeds under the Old Age Pension
Amendment and Article X, Section 3, of the State Constitution,
'93 Colo. 400, 26 P. 2d 1051. See also Moffit v. Pueblo, 55 Colo. 112, 133 P. 754.
1 Denver City Railway Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 41 P. 826, 52 Am. St. Rep.
239, 29 L.R.A. 608; Parsons v. People, 32 Colo. 221, 76 P. 666; Colo. Nat. Life
Assur. Co. v. Clayton, 54 Colo. 256, 130 P. 330; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. School
District, 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260; Hollenbeck v. Denver, 97 Colo. 370, 49 P. 2d 435.
DICTA
Nov.-Dec., 1955
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
Said the Court, 9 in denying the request, and alluding to the
intricacies of the questions involved. ". . . since the matter comes
before our Court as an original proceeding, we are deprived of the
aid and assistance of competent counsel generally prevailing in
instances where we are called upon to review litigated causes."
After pointing out the dangers and uncertainties of pronouncing
judgment after only ex parte consideration, the Court said: "As a
general proposition we seriously doubt the wisdom of prejudging
involved legal problems and fundamental constitutional interpre-
tations in ex parte proceedings of this nature, and it has been, and
is, the policy of our Court to accommodate the legislature only in
such cases as are clear and wherein no possible prejudice to any-
one may later result."
In view of the complexity of the questions propounded and
the very real danger of affecting private rights without adequate
consideration in an ex parte proceeding, the reluctance of the Court
to pass on the questions is understandable and quite consistent with
the caution usually exercised by courts in deciding constitutional
questions, even in adverse proceedings. The policy was as recently
reaffirmed by the Court as in 1954 when the Court refused to pass
on a question of constitutionality saying that the power of courts
to declare legislative enactments invalid because of constitutional
limitations involves a great responsibility, and is to be exercised
with caution and reluctance. 10
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
DECREES
Caution and reluctance to decide constitutional issues were not
the order of the day in the decision of Minnear v. Minnear 11 in
which the Court held unconstitutional, as being repugnant to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution of the United
States, the Colorado statute providing for the manner of enforce-
ment of foreign divorce, separate maintenance, annullment, or
support decrees. The statute involved (Section 46-4-1, '53 C.R.S.)
provides that the courts of this State "shall have power to en-
force the decrees, judgments and orders of other states or juris-
dictions made pursuant to statutes similar to this statute, or amend
the same, or enter new orders, to the same extent and in the same
manner as though such decrees, judgments and orders were en-
tered in the courts of this state."
Plaintiff was divorced from his wife in 1950 in Florida. The
decree ordered the plaintiff here to pay, as a property settlement,
permanent alimony as long as his wife remained unmarried or as
9In Re Interrogatories Propounded by the Senate, Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv.
Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 10; Not Reported in P 2d.
"0 Higgins v. Sinnock, 129 Colo. ,66, 266 P. 2d 1112 (1954).
11 Colorado Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 9; 281 P. 2d 517.
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long as plaintiff remained on duty in the Navy as a naval aviator.
Plaintiff began an action in the District Court in Denver alleging
that the property settlement was obtained by the defendant wife
through trickery, fraud, deceit, undue influence and overreaching;
and plaintiff prayed for an order setting aside the property settle-
ment. Service was obtained upon the defendant in San Fran-
cisco. She appeared by attorney who filed a motion to dismiss for
the reason "that this court does not have jurisdiction." The motion
was sustained and the cause dismissed. Plaintiff sought review on
writ of error from the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the appearance of the defendant was a gen-
eral appearance and that the trial court should not have dismissed
the complaint for want of jurisdiction, but that the error was not
reversible because the statute providing that the courts of this
State may vacate or modify foreign judgments was in violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV, Section 1) of the
Constitution of the United States.
A better case could hardly be found to demonstrate the dan-
gers of deciding questions without the benefit of adverse treatment
by counsel. It is to be noted that the constitutional question of
Full Faith and Credit was not raised, argued, or decided in the
trial court. It was not raised or argued in the brief of the plaintiff
in error in the Supreme Court, and the defendant in error did not
appear in the Supreme Court. Contrary to the reluctance of the
Court expressed in In Re Interrogatories, above to pass upon a
constitutional issue on only ex parte consideration, here we find
the Court boldly undertaking to strike down a statute without any
brief or argument whatsoever. The opinion contains not a single
citation of authority from any court from which we can determine
the source of the Court's conclusion. We are simply told that "The
power of the legislature to fix and determine the jurisdiction of
our courts is subject to the restriction thus imposed by the federal
Constitution. To abide this restriction our courts are open for the
recognition and enforcement of valid foreign judgments, and not
to declare a judgment of another state, in full force and effect for
a number of years, totally void, as is here attempted." And fur-
ther, "For the reasons herein indicated, we determine section
46-4-1, '53 C.R.S., to be unconstitutional as in violation of the full
faith and credit clause of the federal constitution, and therefore
this, or any other proceeding initiated thereunder for the pur-
poses attempted in the instant case, cannot be effective and should
be dismissed."
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has come under interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court of the United States many times. The
established rule is that "the duly attested record of the judgment
of a state is entitled to such faith and credit in every court within
the United States as it has by law or usage in the state from which
DICTA
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it is taken. ' 12 Under such a rule, Full Faith and Credit does not
absolutely prohibit the courts of Colorado from modifying or
vacating a Florida judgment incorporating a property settlement,
as our Court flatly held in Minnear v. Minnear, but rather re-
quires Colorado to give the Florida judgment the same faith and
credit which the courts of Florida would give it. We must, then,
inquire into the action which Florida courts may take with respect
to a Florida judgment confirming a property settlement.
The case of Cohn v. Mann 13 seems to be the case nearest in
point decided by the Supreme Court of Florida among the num-
erous times the question has arisen in that State.1"
In Cohn v. Mann, the plaintiff petitioned for modification of
a final divorce decree which contained the following: "Ordered,
Adjudged and Decreed that the release and property settlement
executed by the parties hereto be, and the same is hereby con-
firmed, and each of the parties is hereby directed to comply with
all of the terms thereof, subject to a further order of this Court."
Specifically, the defendant ex-spouse had by the agreement given
up all her interest in certain property in return for petitioner's
agreement to pay her $75 per week permanent alimony. Petitioner
sought, in the subsequent action, a modification of the weekly pay-
ments on the ground that his financial status had "become so
materially and substantially altered as to render the further pay-
ment of the weekly payments of $75 pursuant to the provisions
of said agreement and decree wholly impossible." Petitioner set
up Section 65.15, F.S., 1941, F.S.A. as authority for the court to
modify the property settlement.
In reversing the trial courts' dismissal of the petition, the
Supreme Court of Florida said in an unanimous opinion:
The prior decisions construing the statutory provi-
sion are as follows:
"We have authority, under Fla. Stat. 1941, Sec. 65.15,
F.S.A., to modify alimony allowances, whether based on
stipulation and decree or upon decree that rests solely on
testimony." Fowler v. Fowler, 159 Fla. 100, 31 So. 2d 162.
"Where the parties have, by mutual agreement, set-
tled their differences by compromise and the court has rati-
fied the same in the final decree, a strong showing is re-
quired to modify the terms thereof." Webber v. Webber.
156 Fla. 396, 23 So. 2d 388.
"When a property settlement provides for an agreed
sum or sums to be paid the wife in lieu of her right to
participate in her husband's property, it will take a very
"Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59, 58 S. Ct. 454, 82 L. Ed. 649 (1938); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R.
413 (1943); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610, 67 S. Ct. 903, 91 L. Ed. 1133 (1947).
13 ---- Fla -....38 So. 2d 465 (1949).
14 See also Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128; Haynes v. Haynes, 71
So. 2d 491 (1954); and other cases cited in the text.
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strong case even in view of Chapter 16780 to modify it."
Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128.
We find that the Chancellor erred in dismissing the
petition. It is not without equity.
It appears from the cases that the Supreme Court of Florida
will order the modification or vacation of a property settlement
agreement upon a showing that the agreement was the product of
fraud or overreaching 15 or, as in Cohn v. Mann, that materially
changed circumstances of the parties dictate modification as a
matter of equity. It follows that if Colorado is to give the Florida
judgment such faith and credit "as it has by law or usage in the
state from which it is taken," the plaintiff in Minnear v. Minnear
should have been given his opportunity to establish by proof his
allegations that the property settlement was obtained by fraud,
deceit and overreaching-the same opportunity which the courts
of Florida would have afforded him.
To aid it in the construction of statutes in constitutional law
cases, the Supreme Court ordinarily adheres to well-established
rules of construction.
The first such rule is that courts are not at liberty to hold a
statute unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. Often the rule as
stated by the Court provides that an act of the legislature is pre-
sumed to be valid and will be held repugnant to the constitutions
only if it appears to be so, clearly, plainly, palpably, and beyond
a reasonable doubt.
16
The second such rule is that if a statute is capable of two
constructions, one of which would render it invalid and the other
valid, the construction which will uphold the statute must be
adopted.
17
It must be conceded that the statute here involved is ambigu-
ous. But ambiguity should not be an excuse for avoiding construc-
Haynes v. Haynes- ____ Fla ..... 71 So. 2d 491 (1954).
16Altitude Oil Co. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202 P. 1.80; Reid v. Colorado, 187
U. S. 137, 23 S. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108; People v. Morgan, 79 Colo. 504; People v.
Rucker, 5 Colo. 455; Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 155, 2 P. 894; Carpenter v.
People, 8 Colo. 116, 5 P. 828; People v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929; Denver
v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204, 30 P. 1041, 17 L.R.A. 135; Newman v. People, 23 Colo.
300, 47 P. 278; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hummer, 36 Colo. 208, 84 P. 61; Union
Pac. R. Co. v. DeBusk, 12 Colo. 294, 20 P. 752; Bd. of Commissioners v. Irr.
Dist., 56 Colo. 515, 139 P. 546; Post Printing & Pub. Co. v. Denver, 68 Colo. 50,
189 P. 39; Mitchell v. People, 76 Colo. 346, 232 P. 685, 40 A.L.R. 566; Broadbent
v. McFerson, 80 Colo. 264, 250 P. 852; U. S. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. McClelland,
95 Colo. 292, 36 P. 2d 164; Rinn v. Bedford, 102 Colo. 475, 84 P. 2d 827; Amer.
Fed. of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145, 160 A.L.R. 873; Champlin
Ref. Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P. 2d 213; Watrous v. Golden Chamber of
Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P 2d 498; Ginsberg v. Centennial Turf Club, 126
Colo. 471, 251 P. 2d 926.
IT C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. School Dist., 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260; Bushnell v. Peo-
ple, 92 Colo. 174, 19 P. 2d 197; Ludlow v. People, 92 Colo. 195, 19 P. 2d 210;
Kimble v. People, 92 Colo. 197, 19 P. 2d 208; People ex rel. Park Res. Co.
v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P. 2d 894; Robinson v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,
99 Colo. 150, 60 P. 2d 927.
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tion of legislative intent. And in the search for legislative intent,
the Colorado cases tell us that we must start with the presumption
that the statute is consistent with the Constitution and must be
so construed unless it is plainly, palpably and beyond a reasonable
doubt repugnant to the Constitution.
Section 46-4-1, '53 C.R.S., in the first paragraph, can be read
as conferring jurisdiction upon Colorado courts to enforce foreign
judgments and to "amend, modify, set aside and make new orders
as the court may find necessary and proper" to the same extent
that Colorado courts have jurisdiction in other similar actions
arising in Colorado. The language quoted above can, without doing
violence to the context, be read to mean that the Colorado courts
may, when "necessary and proper," in light of what the foreign
law dictates, "amend, modify, set aside and make new orders."
The second paragraph of the statute seems to be the principal basis
for our Court's determination that Colorado courts have power,
substantively, to disregard a foreign judgment. But the second
paragraph, by its terms, gives our courts power to modify judg-
ments of sister states only "where the action originated in this
state" and consequently was not involved in Minnear v. Minnear.
Then, too, it must be remembered that it is a reciprocal law
we are construing and the power of Florida courts under the
Florida statutes is the same as the power of Colorado courts under
Colorado law. That being so, a statute which authorizes Colorado
courts to treat a foreign judgment the same way they would treat
a Colorado judgment in effect authorizes the Colorado courts to
treat a Florida judgment the same way the Florida courts would
treat their own judgments.
The statute is susceptible of an interpretation which would
render it constitutional. Despite its ambiguity, Section 46-4-1, '53
C. R. S. can hardly be said to be violative of the Constitution
plainly, palpably, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Perhaps the result in Minnear v. Minnear would have been
different had the Court waited to decide the case until the authori-
ties for and against validity of the statute could have been argued
by counsel.
In Potter v. Potter,8 decided before Minnear v. Minnear, in
an opinion by the Chief Justice which reflects careful study and
research, the Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not require the courts of Colorado to enforce a judgment of the
State of Texas which, by the law of Texas, is not final. The law
is well settled that it is only final judgments which must be given
full faith and credit, and that the faith and credit which one state
must give the judgments of another state is the same credit which
the state of origin would give its own judgment. The controlling
authorities are adequately set out in the opinion on Potter v. Pot-
ter and in footnote 12, above. Minnear v. Minnear could readily
15 Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, No. 6; 278 P. 2d 1020.
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have been decided consistently with Potter v. Potter, leaving the
parties to win or lose on their evidence, and avoiding the excision
of 46-4-1, '53 C.R.S. from the statute books.
It should be noted in passing that the Court did adhere to
its usual policy of restraint in Bawman v. People,1
9 in which the
conviction of the defendant was questioned. Being charged with
rape, the defendant pleaded "Not guilty by reason of insanity at
the time of the commission of the act and since." No other pleas
were entered. Trial was had on the question of insanity and the
defendant was found sane. Motion for a new trial was made on
the ground that certain evidence was admitted which was hearsay.
The motion was denied and the cause continued for the purpose
of taking evidence prior to sentencing the defendant. At the sen-
tencing hearing motions were filed for permission to withdraw the
plea and to plead not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,
and to vacate the verdict, which motions were supported by argi-
ment going to the constitutionality of the statutes governing the
procedure for trial of criminal matters in which insanity is pleaded
as a defense. Such motions were denied, evidence was taken, and
the defendant was sentenced. On writ or error, the Supreme Court
reviewed the matter and reversed the conviction because of the
use of hearsay testimony prejudicial to the defendant. The major-
ity of the Court considered the case disposed of on the evidence
issue and never alluded to the constitutional questions. Just why,
we are not told. Perhaps it was because the constitutional issues
were not raised at the proper time, perhaps because courts ordin-
arily will not decide constitutional questions if a case can be dis-
posed of on other grounds.20 In either event, we find the Courts
exercising a decree of caution here which was not employed in the
cases of Minnear v. Minnear and Holland v. McAuliffe.
TRIAL PROCEDURE ON DEFENSE OF INSANITY HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
The Court was soon again confronted with the question of the
validity of the statute providing for separate trials on the issues
of guilt and insanity when a defendant pleads both not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity. The statute, 39-8-2-3, and 4, pro-
vided, insofar as it applies in the present case, that a defendant
who pleads both not guilty and joins therewith a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity shall be committed to a psychopathic hospital
for observation, and shall be tried first on the issue raised by the
plea of not guilty, in which trial "he shall be conclusively presumed
to have been sane at the time the alleged offense was committed";
then, if found guilty, the defendant shall be tried on the issue of
11 Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 1; 274 P. 2d 591.
2 DeVotie v. McGerr, 14 Colo. 577, 23 P. 980; Platte Land Co. v. Hubbard, 30
Colo. 40, 69 P. 514; Gale v. Statler, 47 Colo. 72, 105 P. 318; People v. Pirie, 78
Colo. 361, 242 P. 72; Mtn. St. Beet Growers' Mkt. Ass'n. v. Monroe, 84 Colo. 300,
269 P. 886; People v. Texas Co., 85 Colo. 289, 275 P. 896; People v. Dist. Ct., 87
Colo. 316, 287 P. 849; Flanders v. Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P. 2d 980; Elliott v.
People, 115 Colo. 382, 174 P. 2d 500; Lipset v. Davis, 119 Colo. 335, 203 P. 2d 730.
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insanity, either before the same or a new jury, in the discretion of
the court; and if found both guilty and sane the defendant shall be
sentenced according to law.
In Leick v. People,21 the defendant was tried first on the plea
of not guilty and the jury returned the verdict of guilty. The jury
was permitted to separate, was reassembled, and in the trial of
the defendant on the insanity issue, returned a verdict finding the
defendant legally sane. On writ of error, the defendant urged
reversal on numerous grounds, three of which the Court consid-
ered: (1) that the statute is unconstitutional which fixes pro-
cedures for the trial of criminal cases in which a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity is entered by the defendant; (2) that error
was committed in giving certain instructions; and (3) the admis-
sion of certain hearsay testimony. Counsel for defendant specific-
ally urged that the procedure violated the due process clauses of
both the State and Federal Constitutions because of the conclusive
presumption of sanity prevailing in the trial of the guilt of the
defendant, and because of the prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the trial of guilt first and the trial of insanity later to the
same jury which had previously heard the full details surrounding
the offense charged.
The record in the case indicated that the jurors were not in-
formed that any presumption, conclusive or otherwise, was to be
indulged by them concerning the sanity of the defendant. Defense
counsel offered testimony of expert and other witnesses on in-
sanity of the defendant and all testimony was received. The
record shows that no evidence offered by defendant bearing upon
his mental condition, and consequently his capacity to premeditate
and formulate the necessary intent, was rejected by the trial court.
The trial court had obviously followed the rule earlier laid down
by the Supreme Court 22 to the effect that application of the statute
to prevent admission of any evidence which a defendant might
have bearing on his ability to deliberate and form the intent to
murder would be a denial of due process of law. The Court held
that it was not the procedure designated by the statute but rather
the procedure actually followed by the trial court which should
determine if defendant's rights had been taken away without due
process. And since the defendant was permitted to make his total
defense, including the consideration of defendant's sanity, in the
first trial, he was not deprived of his life or liberty without due
process. The decision on this matter is well documented by the
Court in its opinion, and many other United States Supreme Court
opinions support the conclusion of the Court that "When consider-
ing the question as to whether procedures conducted under statu-
tory authority were such as to deny due process of law to the
accused in a criminal case, we are concerned only with the facts as
Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sheets, Vol. 7, Number 9; 281 P. 2d 806.
-2 Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. 2d 1112.
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they actually happened and not with speculations upon what con-
ceivably might have taken place under the authority of the act."
The Court also adhered to its previous decisions 23 holding
that statutory separation of the trials on the two issues involved-
guilt and sanity-and trial of both issues to the same jury were not
without due process of law.
As it happened, the Court did not need to decide the constitu-
tional issues in this case, since the conviction was reversed for
errors in the giving of instructions and in the admission of evi-
dence. But the Court no doubt felt compelled to express its views
concerning the statute because of the frequency and vigor of the
attacks being made upon it, and because of the apparent need for
guidance of counsel and the trial court on re-trial of the case. The
Court considered the question of the validity of the statute impor-
tant enough to order oral argument of the matter, allotting one
hour each to the State and the defendant.
For the further guidance of counsel and courts the Supreme
Court volunteered, by way of dicta, two further principles which
merit consideration here. First, a refusal on the part of a trial
court to admit defendant's evidence of mental derangement or
insanity in the trial of the defendant's guilt "would be a denial of
due process of law." And, second, referring to the statutory pro-
vision which reads "A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the
commission of the offense charged," the Court said, "As indicated
by the specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Holland in
Bauman v. People, supra, we doubt the validity of this provision,
." The General Assembly, taking its cue from the decisions,
has modified the statutes 24 to permit the taking of testimony go-
ing to the defendant's incapacity to formulate intent or deliberate
in the trial of guilt, to eliminate the conclusive presumption of
guilt in the trial of the insanity issue, and to require trial on the
insanity issue prior to the trial on the issues raised by the plea of
not guilty.
CRIMINAL LAW
V. G. SEAVY of the Pueblo Bar
The cases which form the content of this review are those
found in Volume 7 of the advance sheets published by the Colorado
Bar Association, numbers 1 through 13.
Cases decided during this period dealing with the criminal
law are not numerically great, and there is little that falls with-
out the category of reaffirmation. The writer has attempted, with
no great degree of success, to divide the cases into the two cate-
gories of procedure and substantive law. Some cases belong in
13 Ingles v. People, supra; Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P. 2d 987.
11 Session Laws, 1955, Ch. 118.
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